Until AD 800 or 900, China was far ahead of any western country in technology, in science, and in culture and civilization altogether (Drucker, 1989, pp. 245-246) Abstract Purpose -China has become an economic powerhouse in historic terms but there are a number of challenges to their continued meteoric economic rise. The aim of this paper is to address a key issue in China's next stage of development: their propensity to create new things and innovate. Design/methodology/approach -The paper is conceptual but uses historical and secondary data to support its assumptions. The paper was written in conjunction with Peter Drucker's Centenary Conference and attempts to take on his challenge 'of the hard work of thinking'. Findings -China has a long history of successful innovation. However, Confucian belief, a single despot and a closing off to the rest of the world have thwarted its innovative edge. The key to rekindling the entrepreneurial spirit "within" will be based on the State's ability to balance the institution of Government with the needs of a creative class. This article identifies that much of this change will rely on quality-related developments rather than simply investments of financial capital. Originality/value -The ability to create new things is a challenge to developing economies that rely on low cost and imitation. China's success in innovation will have substantial implications for developed nations both economically and geopolitically. China wants to be a significant player on a global scale and this paper sheds light on their real potential to achieve such an objective. Through traversing China's innovative landscape, this paper also enlightens the field of management on key aspects of China's innovative past, present and future.
great conversations in history. He was privileged to live in Vienna at a time when Joseph Schumpeter, von Hayek and von Mises of the Austrian School of Economics were sharing ideas with his father. Drucker witnessed the rise and fall of Hitler and would have some real questions on the ascent of a command economy like China. The real battle for China in seeking to rekindle its innovative spirit is Government-centric and will be a function of how the polity copes with, supports and encourages an increasingly liberalised people.
Joseph Schumpeter (1939) identified innovation as the pivotal driving force that devastates some firms but rewards others and leads to surges in economic growth. He called it 'creative destruction' (Schumpeter, 1939; Drucker, 1992) .
Schumpeter noted that the secret to sustained success was being channelled through entrepreneurial 'free spirits'. These free spirits would grow new technology and drive ongoing development. The concept of free spirits would bring a grin to Drucker's face as history has shown that this is China's ultimate paradox. This paper accordingly looks at whether China's free spirits can be unleashed within the dynamic of a command economy. It goes beyond simply looking at the pure economic "grunt" behind China's innovation and identifies some qualitative areas where Drucker's 'knowledge workers' need institutional support. China's rise to a world leader suggests there has never been a more appropriate time to evaluate China's progress.
It is also important to clarify what we mean here by innovation. Various views
exist on what constitutes innovation. Peter Drucker (2002a , p. 95) suggested 'Innovation is the specific function of entrepreneurship…It is the means by which the entrepreneur creates new wealth-producing resources or endows existing resources with enhanced potential for creating wealth'. Theodore Levitt (cited in Shapiro, 2002, p. 7) suggested 'Creativity is thinking up new things. Innovation is doing new things. ' Porter (1990) suggests innovation in its broader sense refers to both new technology and new ways of doing things. Three components of individual creativity that drive innovation include 'expertise, creative thinking skills and motivation' (Amabile, 1998, p. 78) . Amabile believes the organisation influences such attributes. The focus of this paper therefore is on the creation of new things as well as the doing of new things. In essence, it's about creative innovation. Accordingly, innovation around cost efficiencies is not the focus. More radical and disruptive innovation (Christensen, 2000) around creative intelligence (Rowe, 2004) using imagination, creativity and invention (Robinson, 2009 ) is the real entrepreneurial spirit under review. It makes sense for a transient economy with cost benefits to take advantage of abundant low-cost labour. However, this type of innovation has a limited shelf-life. Xie and White (2006) identify that a transition is taking place in China and it's seeing China progress from industrialisation (the 50s), to a 'creation paradigm'. The creation paradigm is central to this paper's question of whether China can reignite innovation.
Peter Drucker focused heavily on the significance of the 'organisation'. He identified that organisation is a relatively new term (post WW2) and suggested 'they are purposefully designed and always specialised' (Drucker, 1992, p. 100). In essence, the PRC is the most populous formal institution and purposeful organisation in the world. China has many organisations but it is also reasonable to see China as one giant system. This is a slightly novel concept (hopefully not too great a stretch for Drucker) but fits well with Institutional Economics. This paper adopts this perspective (referring occasionally to China Inc as a complex organisational system) but equally acknowledges that creativity functions best when it operates from both topdown and bottom-up. If Amabile is correct, the State has the unique ability to nurture each individual's creativity. China's big experiment is best summed up in Deng's notion of "one country; two systems" which opened the door to a market economy. Deng identified that this process needed to be conducted within the context of maintaining guo qing.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The paper begins with China's cultural traditions and then looks at the history of innovation in China. The paper moves on to investigate why China deviated from the West in terms of continuing to innovate. The next section then examines Chinese policies and institutions that facilitate innovation. This sets the scene for a comprehensive evaluation of China's innovative capacity against modern international benchmarks. Important qualitative aspects of China's innovative development are then discussed. The chapter concludes with some important answers to initial questions.
China's cultural traditions
To truly understand innovation in China we must delve into history. Well known philosophers like Confucius and Laozi, strategists like Sunzi, and legalists like Han Fei all played a role and this has had a profound influence on the Chinese.
Confucius' central thesis proffered the benefits of moral virtue. Its later adoption in China led to a non-litigious society reliant on the "rule of man". Xinren (trust) and guanxi (connectedness) became informal surrogates for a lack of formal systems trust. Transitional economies often take time to organise; and corrupt practices like zouhoumen or the back door were more common in this early phase. Robin Dunbar (1999) identified that historically in large populous communities it was easy to cheat and as Dunbar puts it, cheats can prosper.
People in these societies will rely on social trust and informal institutions over formal institutions. This is the case if cultural codes and legal infrastructure are absent. As Dunbar noted, if freeloading behaviour is allowed to prosper it gives rise to what is a 'communal zero sum game'. It's a case of "cheat or be cheated". Merchants have ranked poorly in Chinese history. Such threads did not vary until Deng's leadership and his suggestion that making money can be "glorious".
Indeed, the lack of encouragement for merchants and mercantilism as opposed to mandarins and public service has been identified as a possible source for why China deviated off its technological inventive path (Winchester, 2008) .
History of innovation in China
Many people understand the size of modern China in terms of population but 'what is less known however is China's history as a country of invention ' (vonZedtwitz, 2004, p. 439) . Fernandez-Amesto (1995, p. 680) suggests, 'It is a common-place irony that three inventions which helped to establish western world hegemony -the magnetic compass, gunpowder and the printing presshad been known in China for centuries before they appeared in Europe. ' Joseph Needham (1982) provided an extensive study on the subject. Add to the earlier cited list of inventions, the Great Wall and the Grand Canal and one realises why Chinese, up until the 15 th Century, were inhabitants of a middle kingdom that they believed was the centre of the universe.
What therefore went wrong in terms of innovation? The early 1400s seems to be 
Diverging worldviews
Brown (1991) identified a human universal that he believes is innate to all. This is the propensity to rationalise in a binary dyadic way, which means viewing life as an either/or. However, Chinese seem to have made a gestalt shift and deviated significantly from this norm. This Chinese variation appears to have its roots in the Tao, I-Ching and the Doctrine of the Mean. The essence of yin-yang means the Chinese do not treat objects as binary opposites. Rather, the yin-yang worldview is made up of two symbiotic male-female energies like sun-moon, daynight, and water-fire with such elements capturing both/and (Fang, 2006) .
Nevertheless, it's too simplistic to identify the yin-yang dialectic as solely responsible for China's lack of recent progress. Ultimately, the choice was made in the West to go with scientific method, while the Chinese missed this movement and instead stuck with their more holistic, humanistic paradigm.
Eventually the pathways led to stark changes. Adam Smith was one of the first to question the 'stationary' nature of the Chinese, noting in the Wealth of Nations the rich fertile and industrious nature of its large populous (Smith, 2008) .
Ironically, it was Smith's simple recipe that accentuated the divide. He foresaw benefits in people's strong self interest, business's pursuit of profit, and benefits from specialisation and capital investment.
Max Weber (1951) was one of the first to assess variations in Chinese industrial development. Unlike Catholicism and its offshoot Protestantism, Confucianism is not a religion but acts as a moral way (Fang, 1999) . Weber identified that Protestant-influenced cultures were well placed to take advantage of an economic system built around self interest, private ownership, laws of demand and supply, new technology, entrepreneurial spirits and institutional rules of law.
Ultimately, particularistic ties, the institution of the family (Redding, 1990), a feudal system and a single ruling despot turned out to be less potent economically. The Chinese choice to stick with traditional Confucian cultural thought has therefore had a large influence on the East. It would take China at least half a millennium to try and catch up.
China's recent innovative record
Deng acknowledged that you should 'learn truth from facts' (Fischer & vonZedtwitz, 2004) . This section provides the reader with a brief overview of China's current innovation "state of play". Mao's regime left an indelible mark in modern China. However, the Chinese are flexible and have a long history of resilience. Modern China's evolution as an innovative nation can be divided into five key stages (Xie & White, 2006) : [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] started with the emergence of Mao's People's Republic of China and an industrialised nation built around "bedrock" industries.
• Stage 2 (1960 Stage 2 ( -1978 saw increasing tensions between the Soviet Union and Mao; and the Cultural Revolution devastated much of the local innovative capacity.
• Stage 3 (1978 Stage 3 ( -1991 was the catalyst for the new Open Door Policy (1978) with Deng embarking on a new wave of technology transfer from leading countries.
• Stage 4 (1992-2000) saw a revitalisation of local industry with FDI channelled to broader activities and not simply a means of sourcing cheap wages and production.
• Sigurdson (2004) notes that there is little doubt that China has a goal to become a top tier technological nation but it will need to overcome institutional weaknesses to do so. SOEs have been a traditional focal point of the Chinese Government apparatus and they have been a major inhibitor to China's future.
The Chinese Government is instituting important reforms aimed at opening the SOEs to greater competition (Arrighi, 2007) . The rise of Mainland China private enterprises, international joint ventures and Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises (WOFE) is offsetting some of the impacts.
R&D investment and spending is also acknowledged as a pertinent area for immediate improvement. Management of R&D in China is 'still mostly uncharted territory' (Gassman & Han, 2004, p. 423 
Learning and innovation
The Chinese Imperial Examination system is legendary and has provided a solid process of meritocracy and governance (Dreyer, 1996) . A number of the principles have been passed on and adopted in China's modern school based system. The Chinese university education system has only recently been revitalised. Paul Krugman (1994) noted that the utilisation of social capital led to the rapid rise of the Asian tigers. Undoubtedly, pumping money into the system can improve productivity of social and human capital. The Chinese have an abundance of social equity that can be tapped. Based on pure numbers this should prove fruitful. However, it's the quality of social capital not the quantity that enables creative innovation. If China wants to achieve its ambitious targets for growth in R&D, quality of education is a key issue.
The West still has a lot to learn (Robinson, 2009) when it comes to improving education productivity and education-related creativity and innovation; but it can also pass on some tangible evidence to the Chinese. The best international systems of education have three common elements (Barber & Mourshed, 2007 Creativity and innovation also needs stimulus from fields like the arts and humanities (Rowe, 2004; Robinson, 2009 ). China has thus far focused on building a uniform education system with literacy and numeracy raised to a minimum standard and appropriate year level. These are basal necessities. Kao (Kao, 2009, p. 111) . Nevertheless, the overall culture of education has to change if China wants to grow 'creative intelligence' (Rowe, 2004) and as Drucker (2006, p. 145) would suggest it's 'knowledge workers' who work with their 'minds' rather than hands. Fortuitously also for China, Drucker (1992) identified that education would see a dramatic change in the next 50 years (more rapid than in the past 300) due to technological advancement. There is acknowledgement already in the West that the Chinese have been quick to harness and adapt to such change.
Chinese climate of creativity
Florida (2002) How China can foster its own creative class and climate for creativity is complex for China Inc. However, serious attempts at incubator sub-regions of diversity and high tech development are underway and the results are positive (Chen & Karwan, 2008) . Huawei is a leading example of China's progressive movements toward new things. Ultimately, real change is likely to receive its greatest boost from China's youth and its 'new culture of cool' (Yu, Chan, & Ireland, 2007) .
There are 200 million youthful Chinese living in urban areas (Yu et al., 2007) .
These new 'trendsetters' are expected to have a major influence on China's modern guo qing. Changing demographics and the opportunities it brings for innovation was a key focus of Peter Drucker (see Drucker, Dyson, Handy, Saffo, & Senge, 1997) and it is likely to be a catalyst for change in China as Drucker also suggested (Drucker, 2002b) . Recent controversy over Wikipedia and
Google and their provision of Chinese content offer insights into the growing complexity of these issues.
Nurturing innovation risk-takers
Survival in China has meant learning to adapt and being flexible. Tom Doctoroff (2005, p. 8) notes 'To survive, let alone advance, adaptive traits are required and the Chinese have them in spades'. Believing that 'creativity' is not one of their strengths, he goes on to suggest they revere knowledge and are extremely resourceful, intelligent, patriotic and above all 'analytically and tactically brilliant'.
The Chinese have a history of minimising risk through guanxi and trust (xinren).
The institution of systems trust in China is quite new in relative terms and is changing these behaviours. However, until there is more confidence in the system and litigious success, it is probable that individual risk-taking will be high for businesspeople who move beyond particularistic ties.
Risk taking is also related to business type and style in China. Tan (2001) found no significant difference between the Chinese and their Western counterparts in terms of entrepreneurial propensity to innovate and take risks. However, this was not the case in the more bureaucratic SOEs where political embedded aspects were involved and incentives to innovate and take risks were much lower.
Pluralism is important to acknowledge and generalisations are extraordinarily inappropriate in China. Chinese with a higher propensity for risk taking are therefore not extraordinary. This is one of those paradoxes of the Chinese (Faure & Fang, 2008 ) with many levels of potential variation existing (Tung, 2008) . A new "wave" of Chinese called ex-host country nationals (EHCNs) provides an example. This includes those who have been born and reared overseas and have returned to China, as well as those who have been educated overseas but also returned (Tung, 2008, p. 44) . Interestingly, a cross-cultural study by Weber and Hsee (1998) found that attitudes to perceived risk were relatively the same among their data set of Americans, Germans, Chinese and Polish. Over time, the risk taking argument is likely to dissipate as the aforementioned aspects of diversity and complexity grow.
Managing China's formal and informal institution
Learning, creativity and risk taking are not simply functions of DNA, they are also acquired. Balazs (1965) suggested that it was the State's fault that technological progress was killed off in China by limiting the spirit of inquiry and innovation.
Winchester (2008) Moving away from "Brute Force" to "Hollyworld" or to what Kao (2009, p. 112) suggests is a "Large-scale Ecosystem" model (intensive and extensive innovation with clustering around a National strategy) is extraordinarily difficult.
As noted, China's brute force model built around imitation and cost innovation has served China well. For all the right reasons this transient economy is leading the way as the "factory of the world". This has led to trade imbalances and the US inheriting a large "bill from the China shop" (Dumas, 2008 
Discussion
Rekindling China's innovative creative spirit is arguably China's greatest challenge. It's likely to also take "one country and a modified system". The key for China, as discussed, is not to sit on imitation, cost innovation (Williamson & Zeng, 2007; and manufacturing prowess forever. Modern developed economies show that longer term success will be built on developing knowledge and creative innovation. Following on from the work of Montesquieu, Phillip Parker (1995) identified that culture is a function of the environment. Culture is dynamic and changes over time (Fang, 2006) . Likewise institutions emanate from culture and they need to adapt. Nobel Laureate Douglass North (2005) suggests we should view the world from a non-ergodic perspective, that is, a world in which there is a zero probability that any state of being that has occurred will reoccur (Kriz, Groen & Drew). China Inc. and the people are inextricably linked.
Together they make up China's guo qing. There is a mutual benevolence as identified in the Confucian wulun. But to be truly innovative, the formal institutions of China will ultimately need to continue to follow a modified system that frees its spirits in line with more liberalised values.
Drucker (1992, p. 100) is well known for identifying that in an organisation, "People are our greatest asset". In terms of the people and future knowledge workers of China, rapid economic progress and income equality appear to be two key drivers for China Inc's continued success. The Chinese are extremely intelligent and stand-out negotiators (Chen, 2001 The Government has already orchestrated many of the structural features that need implementation to drive innovation. Spending on education and indigenous R&D as well as platforms for increasing patents and basic science have been set in motion. It is the velocity and speed of change that is probably now most at question. Allowing "free spirits" to run free is difficult in a planned economy built around Marxist (and now Leninist) principles. The ability of Chinese to adapt and a new generation of 'cool' and well educated are likely to be catalysts. There are multi-layers in China and knowledge transfer between Chinese firms and Chinese people is likely to grow. The regional variations are starker than most realise. To the Chinese, these differences are as stark as those between France and Germany, so there is a creative class and climate for creativity already on the go.
Conclusion
China has already reinvented itself in the 21 st Century. The magnitude of China's phenomenal growth is likely never to be repeated. Its next step is to see if it can rekindle creative innovation. The PRC Government is already asking for a change in focus away from imitation to invention. The patent listings show that this is well underway. Brute force has helped but it's now time for China to add to their small band of Nobel Laureates. Such achievements add more than innovative acumen to China but also add "face" and prestige (Sigurdson, 2004) .
The last thing the CEO of China Inc can afford is a major upheaval. This is a delicate balancing act that China has to perform: broadening and enriching the social capital base while allowing creative spirits to flourish. The Chinese are well aware of the capabilities of Hu Jintao. The quantitative elements indicate China is likely to become one of the next great innovators. However, as this paper highlights much is reliant on the softer qualitative aspects. Ultimately, the institution (China Inc.) and the people of China will determine the right balance, velocity and speed.
Joseph Needham wrote the definitive history of technological discovery in China.
However, he never satisfactorily concluded why China lost its early creative advantage. This has been called the "Needham Question". Accordingly, we asked in the introduction: Why did China stop innovating and can it rekindle its innovative spirit? Hopefully, this paper's review of culture and institutions has contributed to resolving this key issue. Winchester (2008) noted that the last 500 years is probably just a 'hiccup' in China's story of creativity and innovation.
Modern ascent is more difficult but only the naïve would bet against China. In the process, Schumpeter's notion of a free spirit may need to be redefined.
Managing the formal institution of Government and the informal institution of the people is the ultimate key to seeing China as a leader rather than a follower in new technology. Given the nature of this article it is worth leaving the last few words to the late Peter Drucker. Fortunately for China, 'the greatest change of all is probably that in the last 40 years purposeful innovation -both technical and social -has itself become an organised discipline that is both teachable and learnable' (Drucker, 1992, p. 97 ).
